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高盛-日本经济分析-081124

日本经济分析
Issue No: 08/26 2008 年 11 月 24 日
高华经济研究网站 经济研究来自高华客户网 https://portal.ghsl.cn

现在买入日本股票的理由:新视点
Tetsufumi Yamakawa
tetsufumi.yamakawa@gs.c om

+44 20 7774 5061

日本股市的表现仍然低迷。今年年初,许 多市场分析人士指出,日本股市具有相对 优势,但实际市场走势却与这些期望背道 而驰。 在今年年初谈论日本股市时屡被提及的一 大优势在于:在全球通胀一路走高的情况 下,日本的通胀率却处于较低水平,因而 出现滞胀的风险较小。但目前市场最担心 的问题是通缩。随着日本的通缩缺口越拉 越大,日本经济也面临越来越大的重回通 缩环境的风险。 关于日本股市相对优势的一些论断仍然有 效。比如,日本企业的财务杠杆相对较 低,事实上远低于历史水平。在较长的一 段资产通缩期内,相对较低的资产负债重 组水平和信贷紧缩风险都是明显的优势。 但与年初相比,这些先前较为明显的优势 已经缩小,这也反映了日本正面临越来越 大的信贷紧缩风险。 与此同时,一些在年初鲜被提及的论断近 来逐渐浮出水面。其中一个论点认为,随 着资源价格的下跌,日本的贸易条件也将 随之改善。但这并不完全是一个利好因 素,因为资源价格的下跌在某种程度上是 全球经济下滑(包括新兴市场)幅度大于 预期的结果。 尽管优势有所缩水,但日本仍可能保持其 相对于其他发达经济体的优势地位。在此 背景下,短期内市场尤为担忧的一个问题 是日元的升值,以及股市表现未能反映这 种相对优势。

信贷进一步收紧的迹象增多
银行对各行业的放贷立场扩散指数
(DI; %) 50 40 Overall Construction and real estate Retail Services Financial crisis

Yuriko Tanaka yuriko.tanaka@gs.com +81 3 6437 9964

30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 83 86 89 92 Tight

Chiwoong Lee chiwoong.lee@gs.com +81 3 6437 9984

95

98

01

04

07 08Q3

资料来源:日本央行

投入价格下降时,各行业贸易条件走势的巨 大差别
贸易条件的变化幅度
50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 (pp)

T-o-T improves relatively with decline in input price

注:贸易条件的相对表现。见第 8 页图表 15 的注解。 资料来源:日本央行

Utility Trasnportation .Transp/comm Textile Pulp/paper Chemicals Communication Cement .Metal prod .Manufact All industries Food percisions Transp. eq Steel ,General eq Wood .Electrical eq Nonferrous Wholesale Nonferrous Wholesale/retai Construction Retail Services Real estate Petrolium

重要信息披露见本报告最后部分

Japan Economics Analyst
Issue No: 08/26 November 24, 2008
GAO HUA ECONOMIC WEBSITE Economic Research from the Gao Hua Portal at https://portal.ghsl.cn

Reasons to Buy Japan Now: New Perspectives
Tetsufumi Yamakawa
tetsufumi.yamakawa@gs.com

+44 20 7774 5061

The Japanese stock market continues to perform poorly. At the beginning of the year, many market observers noted the Japanese market’s relative advantages, but actual marke market trends have run counter to these expectations. A frequently cited advantage of Japanese stocks at the start of the year was that amid an acceleration in global inflation, there was little risk of stagflation in Japan, where inflation remained low. The predominant concern in the market now, however, is deflation, and with the deflation gap in Japan widening, there is increasing risk of a return to a deflationary environment. There are still some valid arguments, for Japan’s relative advantages. Leverage is relatively low at Japanese firms, in fact well below historical levels. In a prolonged period of asset deflation, comparatively low levels of balance sheet restructuring and credit contraction risk are clearly advantages. The scale of these advantages has diminished, however, compared to the start of the year as reflected in rising credit contraction risk in Japan. There are some arguments, meanwhile, that were barely mentioned at the start of the year, but which have surfaced only recently. One is an improvement in Japan’s terms of trade due to declining resource prices. This factor is not an entirely positive one, however, given that resource price declines are partly the product of a worse-than-expected slowdown in the global economy—including EMs. Japan may retain its advantageous position compared to the other advanced economies, although the margin of advantage is diminishing. Against this backdrop, one particular near-term concern is rapid yen appreciation, with relative advantage not being reflected in equity performance.

Signs of Credit Contraction Growing
Bank Lending Stance DI by Sector
50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 08Q3 Tight (DI; %) Overall Construction and real estate Retail Services Financial crisis

Yuriko Tanaka yuriko.tanaka@gs.com +81 3 6437 9964

Chiwoong Lee chiwoong.lee@gs.com +81 3 6437 9984

Source: BOJ.

Large Disparities Among Industries in To-T Trends When Input Prices Are Falling
Margin of Change in T-o-T
50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 (pp)

T-o-T improves relatively with decline in input price

Note: Relative performance in terms of trade. See note to Exhibit 15 on page 8. Source: BOJ.

Important disclosures appear at the back of this document

Utility Trasnportation .Transp/comm Textile Pulp/paper Chemicals Communication Cement .Metal prod .Manufact All industries Food percisions Transp. eq Steel ,General eq Wood .Electrical eq Nonferrous Wholesale Nonferrous Wholesale/retai Construction Retail Services Real estate Petrolium

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Weekly Wrap-Up
Real Economy: Further Downward Revisions to Our Growth Forecasts
Exports have weakened further. The October customscleared trade statistics showed volume steepening to a 6.1% decline (September was -0.2%), the largest since December 2001 when the IT bubble burst. This included the first decline since January 2007 for Asia (-1.8%; September +1.7%), which has nearly 50% weighting and has been providing support while exports to the US and Europe fell back. We expect a low export path for several more quarters at least. Business conditions overseas are at downside risk and the Goldman Sachs Global Leading Indicator, which is a good leading indicator for Japanese exports, has fallen yoy for two months. The November advance reading is -1.5% yoy (October -1.3%; see Exhibit 1). We are expecting negative growth for the Japanese economy in 2009 for the first time since 2001 in fiscal year terms (since 1999 in calendar year). We cut our forecasts to reflect downward revisions to our outlook for the US, Europe, and China during the past few weeks and also the weak domestic demand shown by July-September GDP. Our new forecast is +0.3% for 2008 (previous +0.7%) and a deep cut to -0.6% for 2009 (+0.5%). We expect October-December to mark the third successive quarterly negative GDP growth, which would be the first such sequence since OctoberDecember 2001. Our forecast is -1.5% qoq annualized (July-September was -0.4%) but we see downside risk that hinges on the US (see Exhibit 2). The lower outlook for the economy means a much
Exhibit 1: Exports Have Weakened Further, Asia Included
Export Volume by Region
20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 04 05 06 07 08 10/08 US (20.1) EU (14.8) Asia (48.1) Total exports (yoy % chg; 3m ma)

Exhibit 2: First Negative Growth in Eight Years for 2009
Real GDP Growth: Contribution by Demand Category
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 09 (yoy % chg; contribution pp)
Net exports Private sector demand Public sector demand Real GDP growth our forecast

Source: Cabinet Office, Goldman Sachs Economic Research.

lower inflation prospect. We maintain our 2008 CPI inflation forecast at +1.6% but cut our 2009 forecast to +0.4% (from +0.8%). There is risk on the downside from a widening deflationary gap; we forecast that the negative gap will widen from 3.6% in July-September 2008 to 6.0% in October-December 2009, the widest level since 1999. The inflation forecasts are also be subject to the trend in oil price, where CPI inflation should come down to +1.5% and 0.0% respectively if the oil price would stay at the current level throughout the reminder of 2008 and 2009. We expect the recession that we date from November 2007 to continue to at least mid-2009. This implies that it will exceed the 18-month average since 1960, reaching at least 20 months. Our recession probability index, which indicates probability six months ahead based on key leading indicators, remained higher than 80% almost a year after the recession began, on 84.1% for September (August 86.5%). The exit from the last recession, November 2000 to January 2002 (14 months), was spurred by an export recovery, Japan’s typical pattern. A repeat is unlikely, for next couple of quarters at least, in the current severe global slowdown in demand (see Exhibit 3).

Monetary Policy (BOJ Watch): Reserve Deposits Not Growing Notably
Last week the BOJ started paying interest on reserve deposits (deposits that are in excess of the reserve requirement) as part of the supplementary reserve facility decided at the last policy board meeting. The
2
November 24, 2008

Note: Figures in parenthesis are share of total exports. Source: MOF.
Issue No: 08/26

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Exhibit 3: High Recession Probability Continues
Our Recession Probability Index
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 9/08 (%)

pressure vis-à-vis the dollar and other major currencies and tightening financial conditions in Japan (see Exhibits 5 and 6). Our Global Markets Research Group has cut its interest rate forecast for the US and other major economies. Despite the anticipated fiscal stimulus and increasing burden on governments’ funding, yield curves are likely to be flattening amidst deflation concerns, balance sheet restructuring, and tightening credit squeezes. We see Japan’s long-term interest rate (10-year JGB yield) falling to 1.2% over the next three months.

Note: Shaded areas show economic recession. Source: Goldman Sachs Economic Research Group.

system is similar to the Fed’s and can be seen as a form of quantitative easing that enables the BOJ to supply large amounts of liquidity via the interbank market without reducing the policy rate to zero. The reserve accumulation period runs from November 17 to December 16. As of November 20, however, the reserve deposit balance had yet to change much (see Exhibit 4). Central banks elsewhere have stepped up liquidity supply and their countries’ base money growth is accelerating whereas the BOJ’s supply of yen liquidity remains within normal bounds. At the same time, the BOJ is lagging peers in balance sheet expansion—base money being a liability on the balance sheet. Ultimately we think the BOJ will have to adopt new easing measures since its reactive policy conduct is likely to be accompanied by increasing yen-buying
Exhibit 4: No Major Growth In Reserve Deposits Since Interest Payments Began on Excess Reserves
Reserve Deposit Balance and the Policy Rate
2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 08/7 08/8 08/9 08/10 08/11 (%)
Call rate (average; lhs) Current deposit outstanding (rhs)
Interest paid on excess reserve

Exhibit 5: BOJ Lagging Peers in Balance Sheet Expansion
Major Central Bank Balance Sheets: Assets
350 300 250 200 150 100 50 1/07 7/07 1/08 7/08 11/08 (2007/1=100)
FRB BOE ECB BOJ

Source: Datastream, Data from central banks.

Exhibit 6: Trend in Japan – US Base Money Ratio Points to Further Yen Appreciation
Japan – US Base Money Ratio and Yen/Dollar Rate
30
(yoy % chg; pp) (yoy % chg; pp)

60 30 0 -30

(? tn)

16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

15 0 -15 -30 -45 88
Base money growth (Japan < US) / stronger yen

-60
QE period (BOJ)

Japan/US base money ratio (rhs) Dollar/yen rate (lhs)

-90 06 08 08/11

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04

11/21

Note: Shaded area indicates the call-rate range during the day. Source: BOJ.
Issue No: 08/26

Note: Base money ratio = base money growth in Japan – US. Source: BOJ, FRB.

3

November 24, 2008

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Reasons to Buy Japan Now: New Perspectives
Introduction
The Japanese stock market continues to perform poorly even relative to stock markets in other major economies. One reason is that as the correlation with emerging Asian stock markets has grown stronger, selling pressures on the highly liquid Japanese market have increased. At the beginning of the year, many market observers noted the Japanese market’s relative advantages, but actual market trends have run counter to these expectations. Here, we take a fresh look at several arguments for the advantages of the Japanese stock market, and Japan itself. The most frequently cited advantage of Japanese stocks at the start of the year was that amid the acceleration in global inflation, there was little risk of stagflation in Japan, where inflation remained low, even in a recession (and accordingly Japan would be able to keep financial conditions loose). The concern now, however, has shifted to deflation, and with the deflation gap in Japan widening again, there is increasing risk that Japan too could fall back into deflation. There are still some valid arguments, however. One of the foremost is that leverage is relatively low at Japanese companies (outside the financial sector) and is in fact well below historical levels. In a prolonged period of asset deflation, comparatively low levels of balance sheet restructuring and credit contraction risk are clearly advantages. The scale of these advantages has diminished, however, compared to the start of the year, as risks of credit contraction have increased recently in Japan as well. There are some arguments, meanwhile, that were barely mentioned at the start of the year, but which have surfaced only recently. One is an improvement in Japan’s terms of trade due to declining resource prices. This factor is not an entirely positive one, however, given that resource price declines are the product of a worse-than-expected slowdown in the global economy—including emerging economies. The Japanese economy is still very sensitive to the global economy. Japan may retain its advantageous position compared to the other advanced economies, although the margin of advantage is diminishing. Against this backdrop, one particular near-term concern is rapid yen appreciation, with relative advantage not being reflected in equity performance.
Issue No: 08/26

Reasons to Buy Japan?: Relative Advantages Fading
The Japanese stock market continues to perform poorly even relative to stock markets in other major economies. The Nikkei 225 Average has performed poorly relative to stock markets in other major economies, declining 49.7% year to date (vs. -11.1% in 2007; see Exhibit 7). This poor performance can be partially attributed to stock market corrections in emerging Asian economies. The correlation between the Japanese and Asian stock markets has begun rising again following a temporary decline, and amid a global stock market decline it would not be at all surprising to see significant selling pressures on relatively liquid Japanese stocks, including those for hedging purposes. The P/E forecast for Japanese stocks has fallen sharply to 12.7X from 15.1X at end-2007, but it is still well above the 8.4X P/E forecast for emerging Asian stock markets (15.7X at end-2007; see Exhibit 8). The Japanese economy aside, at the beginning of 2008 the Japanese stock market was widely regarded as having relative advantages over other markets. Here, we take a fresh, comprehensive look at the arguments underlying this view 1 .
Exhibit 7: Japanese Stocks Recording Poor Relative Performance
Declines in Major Stock Market Indexes: Year to date
0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 -80
hai ens ex3 0 ove spa Nik kei Sh ang Na sda q S& P FT 100 Se Vo lsa Da x 500 ng

(%)

Local currency basis Dollar basis

Source: Datastream.

1

See the June 23, 2008, Japan Economics Analyst, “Reasons to Buy Japan Now.”
November 24, 2008

4

Ind ia S

Bra zil B

Me xic o

Ha ng

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Exhibit 8: Correlation between Japanese and Asian Stock Markets Rising Again
Correlation Coefficient between Japanese and Asian Stock Markets
1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1 11/04 05/1
KOSPI Dow Jones Emerging market

Exhibit 9: Japanese Banks Raising their Presence in Overseas Markets
Bank Lending Trends in Overseas Markets
40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 04 05 06 07
Q2/08 08 (yoy % chg)

(correlation)

Japan US UK Germany

11/05 06/1

11/06 07/1

11/07

11/20/08

Source: BIS.

Note: Six-month rolling correlation vs. Nikkei. Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Economic Research Group.

1.

Amid global inflation, Japan has considerable scope to keep financial conditions loose by keeping inflation low (beginning of 2008: √√√; now: X) 2

The inflation argument was one of the most compelling arguments at the beginning of 2008 in favor of Japanese stocks’ relative advantage. At the start of the year, amid global inflation, concerns were growing stronger about the economy falling into a period of stagflation as the economy slowed. The prevailing opinion at the time was that Japan has an advantage in this type of environment as low, stable inflation and a prolonged low interest rate policy meant that it would be able to keep financial conditions loose for a long while. In fact, however, this argument quickly evaporated as inflation expectations rapidly gave way to deflation fears. Japan is now conversely facing the significant risk of deflation rather than inflation. We recently lowered our 2008-09 GDP growth forecast significantly (see Weekly Wrap-Up). Based on our new forecast, we expect the deflation gap, which narrowed to 1.5% of GDP in January-March 2008, to widen to 6.0% in October-December 2009, the widest gap since 1999. 2. Japanese banks are less exposed to toxic assets and credit contraction risk is low (beginning of 2008: √√√; now: √)

Another compelling argument was that Japanese banks are relatively stable as they have limited exposure to subprime loan products, little risk of capital impairment, and stable fund procurement costs. As a result, there were strong expectations at the start of the year that Japanese banks would function as suppliers of capital to US/European financial institutions, they would increase their presence in foreign lending markets, and this would help alleviate the global credit contraction. And, in fact, things were beginning to move in this direction (see Exhibit 9). This view is gradually receding, however. Some Japanese banks also have begun experiencing capital shortages owing to the rapid stock market decline, forcing them to step up capital procurement. In the meantime, fund procurement costs have remained high. The spread between fund procurement costs (3-month TIBOR) and the policy rate (overnight call rate) has been widening in Japan, in contrast to spreads in Europe and the United States. The commercial paper market is not entirely functioning, resulting in a shift in corporate fund demand to bank loans, but with deposit outflows accelerating in low-tier banks in particular, it is growing more difficult to accommodate this fund demand (see Exhibit 10). Signs of a credit contraction are still far less pronounced in Japan than in major Western economies. The bank lending stance diffusion index (accommodative minus tight) in the BOJ Tankan survey has narrowed its margin but still in the cap of “accommodative”, in contrast to a large “tighter” reading for US/European financial institutions. Compared to the beginning of the year, however, when signs of a credit contraction were concentrated
5
November 24, 2008

2

???: valid; ??: somewhat valid; ?: less valid; X: not valid.

Issue No: 08/26

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Exhibit 10: Bank Fund Procurement Costs Remain High Despite Monetary Easing
Bank Fund Procurement Costs and the Policy Rate
1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 96 98 00 02 04 06 08/11 08 3m TIBOR - call rate spread (rhs) (%)
Finantial institutions failure RCC Overnight call rate (lhs) 3-month TIBOR (lhs) QE

Exhibit 12: Signs of Credit Contraction Growing
Bank Lending Stance DI by Sector
50 40 30 20 10
60 40 20 0
(DI; %) Overall Construction and real estate Retail Services Financial crisis

(bp)

120 100 80

0 -10 -20 -30 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 08Q3 07
Tight

Note: Spread between term rate and policy rate. Source: Datastream.

Source: BOJ.

in the real estate, construction, and a few other industries, they are now gradually spreading to other industries such as retail and services as the recession grows longer and more severe. In this sense, too, it is no exaggeration to say that Japan’s relative advantage is disappearing (see Exhibits 11 and 12). 3. Japan’s notably high energy efficiency (beginning of 2008: √√√; now: √)

seventh that in the BRICs, where the ratio was a high 641 in China and 713 in Russia. Needless to say, however, resource prices have fallen sharply since the start of the year, and amid this decline in crude oil and other resource prices, the relative advantage Japan gains from its high energy efficiency is fading. Our energy research group, however, is still bullish on resource prices, except precious metals. They forecast the price of crude oil (WTI) will rise to around US$100/bbl at the end of 2009 owing to supply constraints. If resource prices begin rising again, attention may once again focus on Japan’s superior energy efficiency, but it is difficult to imagine that happening at this time.

Significantly higher energy efficiency in Japan than in other countries was cited as one of Japan’s relative advantages at the beginning of the year, when the predominant outlook called for crude oil and other resource prices to continue rising sharply. Japan is still as energy efficient as ever; it has the lowest energy consumption (relative to GDP) of the major economies, at 107, which is just one-sixth to oneExhibit 11: Relatively Minor Credit Contraction in Japan, However...
Bank Lending Stance DI: International Comparisons
40 20 0 -20 -40 -60 -80 -100 90 95 00 05 4Q08 Tight Japan US Euroland (DI; %)

Reasons to Buy Japan…Still: Some Advantages Exist
4. Japanese companies have low leverage and limited balance sheet restructuring pressures (beginning of 2008: √√√; now: √√ )

Some arguments remain still valid, though perhaps not as much as before. One of the foremost is that the Japanese nonfinancial corporate sector has relatively low leverage and mild balance sheet restructuring pressures. Debt (relative to GDP) in Japan’s nonfinancial corporate sector has been steadily declining since hitting a peak of 130.4% in March 1991, falling to 78.8% as of June 2008, well below the pre-bubble level. Leverage is also low in the household sector in Japan, in contrast to the West— particularly the United States and the UK. Amid a global credit contraction and stronger balance sheet restructuring pressures, one of Japan’s major strengths is that it has completed balance sheet

Source: BOJ, FRB, ECB.
Issue No: 08/26

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November 24, 2008

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

restructuring in the over fifteen years since the bubble collapsed. Japan, like other major economies, is experiencing a recession in the flow-side perspective. From a stock-side perspective, however, Japan is in a far better position than other major economies (see Exhibit 13). It is a fact, however, that there are large disparities in leverage among industries. Examination of the trend in debt (interest-bearing debt balances/cash flow) by industry reveals that debt levels are relatively high in industries such as real estate (12.0), construction (6.6), wholesale/retail (5.2), and textiles (4.9), while they are low in the manufacturing sector, beginning with the transportation equipment (1.0) and electrical machinery (1.6) industries. Further yen appreciation (discussed further below) could trigger these industries with rich cash flow (low debt to cash flow level) to become more aggressive in acquisition of foreign companies. In industries where debt levels are relatively high, the credit contraction—as gauged by the lending stance DI cited above—is especially pronounced, and there is high risk of business conditions deteriorating further due to credit-side factors. Meanwhile, low debt levels in the manufacturing sector mean that companies in these industries should be able to capitalize on their strengths relative to US/European companies in particular once the global economy begins recovering (see Exhibit 14).

Exhibit 14: Large Leverage Disparities Among Industries
Ratio of Interest-Bearing Debt Balances to Cash Flow: Industry Comparison
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 Real estate Construction Whole/retail Nonmanuf. Textile All industry Services Transp / Utilities Food Nonferrous Metal prod. General eq. Steel Business serv. Manufact. Oil/petrol Chemicals Electical eq. Percisions Transp. Eq (X)

Note: As of June 2008. Source: MOF, Goldman Sachs Economic Research.

5.

“Reverse T-o-T shock” underpinning corporate earnings (beginning of 2008: X; now: √√)

Exhibit 13: Leverage Low at Japanese Companies
Debt in the Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Relative to GDP
(% of GDP) 130 110 90 70 50 30 80 84 88 92 96 00 04 08 Japan UK US EU

There are also some arguments that did not apply at the beginning of the year, but surfaced in conjunction with subsequent changes in the external environment. One of the foremost relates to the “reverse terms of trade (T-o-T) shock” produced by the unexpectedly rapid decline in crude oil and other resource prices. Japan’s terms of trade deteriorated markedly when resource prices were rising, and to that extent corporate earnings can fully be expected to rise as resource prices fall. The sharp correction in resource prices, however, is in part attributable to the economic slowdown in emerging economies. Accordingly, while the terms of trade are improving in conjunction with resource price declines, we must watch out for sales contraction (top-line growth shortfalls) due to weak sales volume especially in export-oriented industries that depend highly on emerging economies. There are also large disparities among industries in terms of trade trends during periods of rising and falling resource prices. When resource prices are falling, greater-than-average improvement in the terms of trade tends to be seen in industries such as electric power/gas, transportation, chemicals, paper/pulp, ceramic/stone/clay products, and fibers. Particularly marked improvement is seen in the electric power/gas industry. Industries where greater-than-average deterioration is seen in the terms of trade when resource prices are falling include nonmanufacturing

Note: Debt = credit market instrument (borrowing + non-equity securities). Source: BOJ, US Federal Reserve, UK Office of National Statistics, Eurostat.
Issue No: 08/26

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November 24, 2008

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

sector industries such as petroleum products, precision machinery, real estate, services, and wholesale/retail. The terms of trade are stable during both periods of rising and falling resource prices in industries such as metal products and communications (see Exhibit 15).

pp decline in the GLI). Exports to China account for 15% of exports from Japan, and the elasticity of production in China to the GLI is also very high, at 3.66. The stronger downside risks to the global economy become, the more the margin of Japan’s advantage shrink (see Exhibit 16). Against this backdrop, one particular near-term concern is rapid yen appreciation. In the event that Japan’s relative advantages are not really reflected in a rise in share prices fueled by overseas investors buying Japanese stocks, while yen appreciation begins to accelerate on the back of speculative flows, this will further increase the risk of deflation and lead to corporate earnings declines. Since the beginning of the year, the yen has strengthened 15.4% against the dollar and 35.9% against the euro, and the effective yen rate has climbed 25.1%. We estimate a 10% rise in the yen against the dollar lowers corporate earnings growth by 0.9 pp and a 10% rise in the effective yen rate lowers growth by 1.0 pp. We are forecasting further yen appreciation— including a possible overshoot—over the next three months, in particular, owing to the unwinding of carry trades by speculators and deleveraging. We forecast yen/dollar rates of 90 and yen/euro rate of 108 in three months. Tetsufumi Yamakawa

Risks: Pickup in Yen Appreciation
As we have seen, the arguments for Japan’s and Japanese stocks’ relative advantages have changed significantly amid the global economic slowdown/recession. Several of the arguments made at the start of the year have already lost their validity, while there are still some arguments that are valid. Two of the most important ones are related to Japanese companies’ relatively low leverage amid global trend of deleveraging and the fact that Japanese companies readily benefit from improvements in the terms of trade produced by declining resource prices. Even so, Japan’s advantages have undeniably diminished compared to the start of the year. Japan is still very sensitive to the global business cycle. Our global economic research group estimates that the elasticity of production in Japan to the Goldman Sachs Global Leading Indicator (GLI) is one of the highest among major economies, at 2.25 (meaning that production in Japan contracts by 2.25 pp for every 1
Exhibit 15: Large Disparities Among Industries in Terms of Trade Trends When Resource Prices are Falling
Margin of Change in Terms of Trade When Input Prices are Falling
50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 Utility Trasnportation .Transp/comm Textile Pulp/paper Chemicals Communication Cement .Metal prod .Manufact All industries Food percisions Transp. eq Steel ,General eq Wood .Electrical eq Nonferrous Wholesale Nonferrous Wholesale/retai Construction Retail Services Real estate Petrolium
(pp)

T-o-T improves relatively with decline in input price

Exhibit 16: Japan’s Beta to the Global Business Cycle Still High
Elasticity of Production to GLI
(Beta) 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1
More sensitive to slowing global industrial cycle

Average (=1.35)

Note: Instead of the usual definition of terms of trade (= input price / output price), which only covers manufacturing sector, here we use the businesses’ assessment on price trends from the BOJ Tankan survey. We define the terms of trade DI as sales price DI – input price DI. The average change in TOT DI during the 4 phases of input price declines (measured in % points) for each industry is compared with the industry average (=5.6% points) . Source: BOJ, Goldman Sachs Economic Research.
Issue No: 08/26

Note: Decline in production to 1% deceleration in GLI (elasticity). Source: Goldman Sachs Global Economic Research.

8

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November 24, 2008

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Upcoming Releases
Date Nov. 25 Nov. 26 Nov. 27 Nov. 28 8:30 8:30 Time Indicators and events JGB Liquidity Supply Auction BOJ Governor Shirakawa Speaks 2yr JGB Auction Household Survey (All households; Oct.) Real consumption spending Labor Market (Oct.) Unemployment rate Job offers to applicants ratio Tokyo Area CPI (Nov.) Overall Excl. fresh food Excl. food and energy National CPI (Oct.) Overall Excl. fresh food Excl. food and energy Industrial Production (Oct.) Retail Sales (Oct.) New Housing Starts (Oct.) BOJ Governor Shirakawa Speaks Monthly Employment Statistics (Oct.) Total cash wages Reuters Tankan (Nov.) 10yr JGB Auction MOF Corporate Statistics (Q3) Capex JGB Liquidity Supply Auction BOJ Vice Governor Nishimura Speaks yoy % -3.5% 4.2% 0.82X yoy % yoy % yoy % yoy % yoy % yoy % mom % yoy % yoy % +1.4% +1.3% +0.5% +1.5% +1.8% +0.1% -3.2% -0.6% +32.0% -3.4% 4.2% 0.82X +1.1% +1.2% -2.3% 4.0% 0.84X +1.2% +1.5% +0.4% +2.1% +2.3% +0.2% +1.1% -0.4% +54.2% GS Consensus Previous

8:30

8:30

+1.7% +1.9% -2.5% -0.9% +29.8%

8:50 8:50 14:00 Dec. 01 10:30 Dec. 02 Dec. 04 8:30 8:50

Dec. 05

November Tokyo, October National CPI (√√): We expect CPI inflation to subside. We forecast a fall to +1.5% yoy for the national overall index in October (September +2.1%), oiled by gasoline price decline. Similarly, we forecast +1.8% (+2.3%) for the core index excluding fresh food. We expect the “core core” index to stay low, at +0.1% (+0.2%), on the basis of a widening deflationary gap and stalled wages under recessionary conditions. October Industrial Production (√√√): Production is looking increasingly weak. We forecast -3.2% mom for the October index, a steeper decline than the prior corporate plans (-2.3%); September was +1.1%. We expect October-December to mark the fourth successive quarterly decline; our forecast is -3.8% (JulySeptember -1.2%). Now that exports have slowed more than expected, we envisage a longer and deeper production correction centered on IT and capital goods. October Labor Market (√√): Labor market conditions are undergoing mild deterioration. We expect unemployment to return to growth, reaching 4.2%, after dipping to 4.0% in September on growth in discouraged workers who have stopped looking for work due to decline in job opportunities. We forecast another deterioration for the job offers/applicants ratio, to 0.82X, from September 0.84X.
Note: The importance of the economic indicator in terms of its impact on the market is indicated by “very high:√√√”, “high: √√”.

Issue No: 08/26

9

November 24, 2008

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Key Data
Main Economic Forecasts
Calendar year 2007* 2008 2009 2.2 0.3 -0.6 1.7 0.7 -0.2 2.0 -1.8 -2.1 2.9 -0.3 -2.6 -0.8 0.0 24.8 -1.2 1.6 19.4 0.4 0.4 20.1 2007 1.7 1.7 -0.1 2.6 7.0 -1.0 0.3 24.5 Fiscal year 2008 2009 1Q2008* -0.4 -0.1 2.5 0.3 -0.1 2.4 -2.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.8 -1.5 2.3 -12.0 -7.0 -0.7 0.5 -1.5 1.6 0.3 1.0 19.7 20.7 6.6 2Q* -3.7 -2.2 -5.5 1.0 -1.6 1.4 3.9 Quarterly 3Q* 4Q 1Q2009 -0.4 -1.5 -0.6 1.1 -1.2 -0.2 -6.7 -4.0 -1.0 -0.4 -2.8 -4.0 -1.6 2.4 6.6 0.1 1.5 5.0 0.4 0.9 6.8 2Q 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.6 0.4 0.5 3.9 3Q 0.5 0.2 0.5 -2.2 0.5 0.2 4.4 4Q 0.5 0.1 0.7 -1.5 0.4 0.2 5.0

Real GDP (% qoq ann) Private consump. Private capex Ind. prod. (yoy % chg) Corporate profits GDP deflator (yoy % chg) Core CPI (yoy % chg) Current account (? tn)

* Show s actual figures Source: Goldman Sachs Economic Research Forecasts.

Interest Rate Forecast
(%)
Overnight call rate Three-month TIBOR JGB ten-year 1Q2007* 0.50 0.70 1.66 2Q* 0.50 0.70 1.87 3Q* 0.50 0.80 1.68 4Q* 0.46 0.86 1.50 1Q2008* 0.50 0.84 1.36 2Q* 0.50 0.85 1.61 3Q* 0.54 0.87 1.47 4Q 0.30 0.60 1.20 1Q2009 0.30 0.60 1.20 2Q 0.30 0.60 1.30 3Q 0.30 0.60 1.40 4Q 0.30 0.60 1.60 1Q2010 0.30 0.60 1.70

Note: Yield in BEY basis. Source: Goldman Sachs Economic Research Forecasts.

* Show s actual figures.

Recent Economic Indicators
4Q2007 Real GDP Industrial production Tertiary activity Leading indicator (CI) Real household consumption Retail sales Machinery orders (a) Housing starts Export volume (b) Import volume (b) Trade balance (c) Current account balance (c) Unemployment rate CPI Tokyo (excl. fresh food) Domestic corporate price Money stock M2 ?/US$ exchange rate (d) Three-month TIBOR (d) Benchmark bond yield (d) Nikkei 225 stock price (d) % qoq ann. % mom % yoy % mom 2005=100 % yoy % yoy % mom % yoy % yoy % yoy ? bn ? bn % % yoy % yoy % yoy ?/US$ % % ? 1.8 0.9 3.3 -0.1 104.9 0.7 0.8 0.6 -27.3 7.7 1.4 3,012 6,236 3.8 0.5 2.4 2.0 113.1 0.85 1.57 15,997 1Q2008 2.5 -0.7 2.3 -1.1 103.6 0.7 1.8 2.2 -9.0 9.5 1.4 2,338 5,592 3.8 1.0 3.5 2.3 105.2 0.85 1.39 13,294 2Q2008 -3.7 -0.8 1.0 0.9 102.7 -2.6 0.2 0.6 -11.0 5.3 2.2 1,629 4,809 4.0 1.5 4.9 2.1 104.5 0.84 1.61 13,813 3Q2008 -0.4 -1.3 -1.4 -0.6 101.7 -2.3 0.8 -10.4 40.2 2.6 1.3 63 3,430 4.1 2.3 7.1 2.2 4/08 5/08 6/08 7/08 8/08 9/08 10/08

-0.2 1.9 1.9 102.0 -2.7 0.1 5.5 -8.7 9.3 5.9 662 1,530 4.0 0.9 4.0 1.9

2.8 1.1 -0.2 103.7 -3.2 0.3 10.4 -6.5 7.1 -3.4 844 2,008 4.0 1.5 4.9 2.1

-2.2 0.0 -1.0 102.4 -1.8 0.3 -2.6 -16.7 -0.1 4.5 123 1,271 4.1 1.9 5.8 2.2

1.3 2.4 1.2 103.5 -0.5 2.1 -3.9 19.0 9.1 2.3 348 1,556 4.0 2.4 7.3 2.1

-3.5 -6.9 -1.3 100.7 -4.0 0.6 -14.5 53.6 -0.8 -4.4 -208 903 4.2 2.4 7.4 2.4

1.1 0.2 -0.6 100.9 -2.3 -0.3 5.5 54.2 -0.2 6.2 -77 971 4.0 2.3 6.8 2.2 -6.1 -2.4

4.8 1.8 100.3 0.88 1.51 9,117

107.6 102.5 104.1 106.9 106.8 109.3 106.8 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 1.51 1.41 1.67 1.75 1.60 1.46 1.48 12,761 13,358 13,995 14,085 13,169 12,989 12,124

(a) Private-sector orders, excluding electric power and shipping. (b) Customs cleared. (c) Balance of payments, seasonally adjusted. (d) Period average.

Issue No: 08/26

10

November 24, 2008

Goldman Sachs Economic Research

Japan Economics Analyst

Economic Calendar
Monday November 24 Tuesday November 25 Wednesday November 26 BOJ Governor Shirakawa Speaks [2yr JGB Auction] Labor Market (Oct.) Unempl. rate (E): 4.2% Job offers/appl. (E): 0.82X Household Survey (All households; Oct.) Real spending (E): -3.5% yoy [JGB Liquidity Supply Auction] December 1 BOJ Governor Shirakawa Speaks Monthly Labor Stat. [10yr JGB Auction] December 8 Money Stock (Nov.) Economy Watchers Survey (Nov.) Balance of Payments (Oct.) December 15 BOJ Tankan (Dec.) December 9 Revised GDP (Q3) Leading Indicator (Oct.) December 10 Corporate Price (Nov.) Machinery Orders (Oct.) [JGB Liquidity Supply Auction] December 17 December 18 Monetary Policy Meeting [2yr JGB Auction] December 24 Customs-Cleared Trade (TBD; Nov.) HOLIDAY Industrial Production (Nov.) Retail Sales (Nov.) December 29 December 30 December 31 January 1 December 25 Housing Starts (Nov.) December 26 CPI (Dec./Nov.) Household Survey (All households; Nov.) Labor Market (Nov.) Monthly Labor Stat. (Nov.) January 2 December 19 Monetary Policy Meeting BOJ Governor's Press Conf. [20yr JGB Auction] December 22 BOJ Governor Shirakawa Speaks Reuters Tankan (Dec.) December 23 [JGB Liquidity Supply Auction] December 11 December 12 Mfg. Operating Rate (Oct.) Consumer Confidence (Nov.) December 2 Reuters Tankan (Nov.) December 3 December 4 MOF Corporate Statistics (Q3) Thursday November 27 Friday November 28 CPI (Nov./Oct.) Excl. fresh food Tokyo Nov. (E): +1.3% yoy Nation. Oct. (E): +1.8% yoy Industrial Production (Oct.) (E): -3.2% mom Retail Sales (Oct.) (E): -0.6% yoy Housing Starts (Oct.) (E): +32.0% yoy December 5 BOJ Vice Governor Nishimura Speaks

HOLIDAY

[5yr JGB Auction] December 16 Tertiary Activity (Oct.) FOMC

HOLIDAY Half Day

HOLIDAY

HOLIDAY

Issue No: 08/26

11

November 24, 2008

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Japan Economics Analyst Renminbi Appreciation: Winners and Losers, April 18, 2008 NPL Disposal and the Real Economy: Crossing the Rubicon, April 28, 2008 A Real Comeback for the “Reflation Trade”?, May 12, 2008 Japanese HIA: Shot in the Arm for Capex?, May 21, 2008 Signs of Inflation: Perceived Inflation Rising Rapidly, June 16, 2008 Reasons to Buy Japan Now, June 23, 2008 BEI Long: Most Effective Inflation Hedge for Japan, July 4, 2008

It’s All About the R’s: The Road from Recession to Recovery / Cabinet Reshuffle: Stepping Stone for Tax Reform, August 5, 2008 Japan Leading the Field in Balance Sheet Restructuring, August 25, 2008 Bright Spots for Japanese Economy, September 1, 2008 Financial Crisis: History Repeats Itself, September 29, 2008 BBoP: On the Way to Deficits?, October 3, 2008 Financial Crisis: History Repeats Itself (Part II), October 13, 2008 Monetary Policy: Shifting into Crisis Response Mode, November 5, 2008 Financial Crisis: History Repeats Itself (Part III), November 17, 2008

Issue No: 08/26

12

November 24, 2008

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